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Incentives play an important role in motivating community health workers (CHWs). 
In  India, accredited social health activists (ASHAs) are female CHWs who provide a 
range of services, including those specific to reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child, and 
adolescent health. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 49 ASHAs and one of 
their family members (husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, or son) from Gurdaspur and 
Mewat districts to explore the role of family, community, and health system in supporting 
ASHAs in their work. Thematic analysis revealed that incentives were both empowering 
and a source of distress for ASHAs and their families. Earning income and contributing 
to the household’s financial wellbeing inspired a sense of financial independence and 
self-confidence for ASHAs, especially with respect to relations with their husbands and 
parents-in-law. In spite of the empowering effects of the incentives, they were a cause 
of distress. Low incentive rates relative to the level of effort required to complete ASHA 
responsibilities, compounded by irregular and incomplete payment, put pressure on 
families. ASHAs dedicated much of their time and own resources to perform their duties, 
drawing them away from their household responsibilities. Communication around incen-
tives from supervisors may have led ASHAs to prioritize and promote those services 
that yielded higher incentives, as opposed to focusing on the most appropriate services 
for the client. ASHAs and their families maintained hope that their positions would 
eventually bring in a regular salary, which contributed to retention of ASHAs. Incentives, 
therefore, are both motivating and inspiring as well as a cause dissatisfaction among 
ASHAs and their families. Recommendations include revising the incentive scheme to be 
responsive to the time and effort required to complete tasks and the out-of-pocket costs 
incurred while working as an ASHA; improve communication to ASHAs on incentives 
and responsibilities; and ensure timely and complete payment of incentives to ASHAs. 
The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature on incentivized CHW 
programs and help throw added light on the role incentives play in family dynamics which 
affects performance of CHW.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Community health worker (CHW) programs have been intro-
duced as a strategy to link the community with the health care 
system with the aim to identify health needs of the community 
and bring these to the focus of health care providers. CHWs are 
lay health workers trained to deliver certain health services but 
have no formal professional education (1). They are paid for 
performing certain activities either as a salary or an honorarium 
(2) by a government health structure or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).
A review of incentives for CHWs found that they improve 
retention of workers (3). However, there are challenges as pay-
ments may be insufficient considering the level of effort required 
to complete the work, or may not be paid regularly (3). In general, 
CHWs earn less than a living wage and may resort to other 
sources of generating income (4, 5). In addition, incentives can 
influence CHWs to focus on funded activities at the expense of 
unfunded activities (6) and can lead to mistrust in the communi-
ties as clients suspect CHWs push particular services rather than 
promoting what is best for the client (7). Incentives can also lead 
communities to view CHWs as government employees and either 
expect more services than what CHWs can provide or lose trust 
in them (3). It has also been demonstrated that non-financial 
factors, such as training and supervision, job aids, improved 
working conditions, and personal growth opportunities, are 
important in CHW programs and should be considered when 
designing incentive programs (3, 7, 8).
inDia’s asha PrOgraM
India’s accredited social health activists (ASHAs) are female CHWs 
selected from the village to which they belong (one per 1,000 
population) to perform the following services: (1) counseling 
pregnant women and facilitating access to antenatal care (ANC) 
and facility delivery; (2) distributing oral rehydration packets, 
iron folic acid tablets, chloroquine, oral contraceptive pills, and 
condoms; (3) facilitating access to immunizations for children; 
and (4) providing information on health and health practices. 
The ASHA is required to have completed 8 years of education (9) 
but in places with severe human resource shortages this require-
ment has been relaxed, and women with no education but with 
demonstrable leadership skills have been selected. The ASHA 
works under the direct supervision of the ASHA facilitator and 
auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM) based at the closest sub-center. 
The program, which started in 2005, envisioned the ASHA as 
the first port of call for any health-related needs of marginalized 
sections of the population, especially women and children, who 
find it difficult to access health services.
Accredited social health activists receive incentives for the 
activities they carry out which range from Rs 50 (US$0.83) for 
early registration of pregnancy to Rs 1000 (US$16.67) for facili-
tating permanent contraceptive methods. ASHAs are also paid 
for identifying and referring cases of leprosy, tuberculosis, and 
malaria, undertaking health surveys, and mobilizing village health 
meetings. Incentives are disbursed from the ASHA program of the 
National Health Mission (NHM) of the Government of India and 
are augmented by other funds and schemes. One such scheme is 
the Jannai Suraksha Yojana (JSY) under which pregnant women 
are paid for delivering at an institution, and ASHAs are paid for 
mobilizing the women for the same. A working paper prepared 
for the NHM Advisory Council in 2011 recommended providing 
higher incentives for ASHAs as the current amount of payment 
was not proportional to the work required (10). Revision of 
incentive rates on current and new activities has been proposed 
by NHM so that ASHAs receive at least Rs 1000 ($16.67) a month 
(11). This has been implemented for certain routine procedures, 
such as attending monthly meetings and maintaining records.
ASHAs have expressed dissatisfaction with the incentives (10, 
12) and expectations of better or regular pay (13). However, one 
study found no association between the level of dissatisfaction 
on incentives and motivation among ASHAs, indicating that 
incentives do not always drive motivation and work performance 
among this cadre of workers (14).
There are state variations in the incentive amounts paid to 
ASHAs. Certain states, such as Kerala, Haryana, and West Bengal, 
have decided to provide monthly fixed remuneration to ASHAs 
from their own budgets (15). However, it is unclear whether this 
has been implemented. In Haryana, the state government has 
implemented a fixed monthly remuneration of Rs 500 translating 
to U$8.30 (16), but anecdotal reports indicate that ASHAs have 
not been receiving this compensation. In Punjab, there is yet no 
fixed remuneration.
The broad objective of this qualitative study was to look at 
the influences of the family, community, and health system on 
the ASHA workers’ performance and motivation. Within each 
of these institutions, incentives play a role in directing the work 
activities of ASHAs. The current paper, therefore, deals with the 
role of incentives in motivating ASHAs and influencing their 
work. In addition, the paper  seeks to document how ASHAs 
interpret information about incentives.
MeThODs
Two districts, Gurdaspur and Mewat, were selected purpo-
sively because of their socio-economic and religious diversity. 
Gurdaspur, a district in Punjab, has lower than national average 
maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of 155 per 100,000 live births 
and infant mortality rate (IMR) of 26 per 1000 live births (17) 
compared to the national average of 178 per 100,000 and 40 per 
1000 live births, respectively (18). However, Gurdaspur has a 
low child sex ratio (821 girls per 1000 boys) due to a cultural 
preference for male children. In rural areas of Gurdaspur, 79.5% 
of women deliver in facilities, 86.2% of women access any ANC, 
and full immunization coverage is 64.3% (17). Mewat, a district 
in Haryana, has a MMR of 160 per 100,000 live births and IMR of 
64 per 1000 live births. In rural Mewat, 40.3% of women deliver in 
facilities, 30.5% women access any ANC, and full immunization 
has covered only 20.8% of children (19). According to the 2011 
Indian Census, Mewat has a lower literacy rate (53 as compared 
to 80% in Gurdaspur), and lower work participation rate (27 com-
pared to 33% in Gurdaspur) (18). Gurdaspur has 1253 ASHAs; 
Mewat has 908 ASHAs.
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One block in each district was selected based on average 
performance in selected RMNCH + A indicators. In the selected 
block in Gurdaspur, 10 sub-centers were selected; five of which 
were high performing and five of which were poor performing 
in terms of RMNCH + A indicators. Two lists of ASHAs work-
ing in these two groups of sub-centers were compiled. The first 
12 ASHAs from each list were selected. In Mewat, the selected 
block had four primary health centers (PHCs), each of which 
had between three and four sub-centers. One sub-center from 
each PHC was purposively selected to represent diverse caste and 
religious groups. Lists of ASHAs working in those sub-centers 
were compiled and the first six ASHAs on each list were selected 
for participation. One ASHA in the sample had no decision-
making family member (e.g., husband or mother-in-law) living 
with her; therefore, we interviewed her son. However, we selected 
an additional ASHA who did have a decision-making relative 
living with her. A total of 49 eligible ASHAs were selected for 
participation in an interview, which provided a sufficiently large 
enough sample to achieve saturation. Inclusion criteria were: 
being married, below age 50 (while the official age limit of ASHA 
is 45 years, we assumed that there may be older women recruited 
as ASHA and, therefore, we wanted to keep the cut off age as 50), 
and consent to participate. Our final sample included 21 Sikhs, 
one Hindu, and three Christians in Gurdaspur, and nine Muslims 
and 15 Hindu in Mewat. Compared to ASHAs in Mewat, ASHAs 
in Gurdaspur spent a higher average number of years in school 
(9.7 compared to 6.5), had fewer children (two versus four), and 
had more experience as an ASHA (5 versus 2 years).
We also interviewed one family member for each interviewed 
ASHA: 34 husbands, 13 mothers-in-law, 1 sister-in-law, and 1 son. 
There was a preference to interview the husbands; however, in the 
event they were not available, the mother-in-law was interviewed. 
In two instances, neither the husband nor the mother-in-law was 
available and an alternative family member was interviewed 
(sister-in-law and son).
Trained interviewers conducted semi-structured interviews 
using a pre-tested guide. The first author conducted a 2-day train-
ing for interviewers on the purpose of the study, the interview 
guide, qualitative interviewing techniques, and human subjects 
research ethics. The interview guide was developed in English 
and then translated into Hindi and Punjabi and back translated 
into English. Following the interviewer training, the guide 
was pre-tested to ensure clarity of purpose and wording of the 
questions. The interviews were conducted in Hindi and Punjabi 
and audio-recorded with the permission of the respondents. 
Interviews were transcribed and translated into English. A sam-
ple of 15 transcripts was reviewed by two researchers and formed 
the basis of the coding scheme that was applied to the remaining 
transcripts. Codes related to incentives were then separated and 
examined individually as well as part of the entire narrative. Two 
key themes were identified and are discussed below: incentives 
as a source of power and independence and incentives as a cause 
of distress.
Written informed consent was obtained from all respondents. 
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
University Research Company (URC) in Maryland, USA and 
CMS Institutional Review Board, in Delhi, India.
FinDings
incentives as a source of Power and 
independence
Incentives lent some amount of self-reliance among ASHAs who 
reported an increase in self-confidence: “I always wanted that my 
work should get increased and I should earn more money. Then 
by earning more, my self-confidence gets increased. I feel encour-
aged to do more and more work.” (ASHA #5, Mewat)
This increased self-confidence was entwined with their grow-
ing financial independence. Earning their own money eliminated 
the requirement to rely on husbands and mothers-in-law for 
spending money.
I no longer have to please my relatives. Earlier I used 
to please them to get favours. Now I am working and 
earning my livelihood so I am no more under them. 
After becoming ASHA I don’t have to ask anybody for 
favours except God. I have gained strength. (ASHA #6, 
Mewat)
For most ASHAs, the finances gained from their work were 
spent on items for their children, with less being spent on them-
selves or their own family; most were able to use their own discre-
tion on these types of purchases. Discussions around spending 
money on the ASHAs’ families, however, were still held with hus-
bands or mothers-in-law with a joint decision-making process. 
An added benefit, reported by some ASHAs, was that there was 
less domestic conflict after they became ASHAs and started earn-
ing an income. There was also more sharing of household chores 
by mothers-in-law, husbands, and other female relatives, leaving 
time for ASHAs to accomplish their official duties. Additionally, 
in terms of decision-making in other areas of household manage-
ment, such as health care seeking, ASHAs reported a shift as a 
result of their position. One ASHA explained:
Interviewer (I): Who takes decision for check-up if 
somebody falls sick at home?
Respondent (R): Yes, I give them advice to consult doc-
tor for particular disease.
I: Did you give such advice before?
R: No, I started to give such advices after being ASHA 
worker. (ASHA #30, Gurdaspur)
Thus, working as an ASHA and gaining some financial 
independence and self-confidence were empowering for our 
respondents as it translated into household sharing of chores and 
increased decision-making around seeking health care. For some 
women, it led to decreased conflict with husbands.
incentives as a cause of Distress
In spite of this developing self-reliance and independence, incen-
tives were a cause of distress among ASHAs for several reasons.
Relative to Work Required
Accredited social health activists did not feel that incentives 
were commensurate with the responsibilities and level of effort 
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required to complete the corresponding tasks. The majority of 
ASHA respondents in Gurdaspur complained that the amount 
of money they received was too low compared to their work-
load. This was not as common a complaint in Mewat, where 
being able to earn any income was important for the ASHA 
and her family. ASHAs were also required to complete forms 
documenting the services they provided, which functioned as 
invoices. The documentation was time consuming and pre-
sented a particular challenge for illiterate ASHAs, who sought 
help from their children, neighbors, or ANMs. Illiterate women 
sometimes were not paid because they did not fill in the forms 
correctly: “I am not being paid because I cannot fill the card 
correctly. Sometimes I do mistakes so I try to get it corrected by 
ANM by visiting the sub-center several times in a day” (ASHA 
#6, Mewat).
Accredited social health activists reported that some activi-
ties were bundled, requiring a level of effort not reflected in the 
corresponding compensation. For example, ASHAs were paid 
for attending institutional deliveries in government facilities. 
This could require a number of steps, including educating 
pregnant women about the benefit of delivering at facilities, 
arranging and accompanying them in the ambulance, and 
attending the entire delivery. Some ASHAs unable to attend 
deliveries at night reported that they failed to get paid for cases 
where they called an ambulance to transport a pregnant woman 
for delivery, but did not accompany her. This put pressure on 
them to attend night deliveries even if it meant leaving their 
own children, creating problems at home. In cases where 
pregnant women from the catchment area of ASHA returned 
to their natal home for childbirth, the ASHA was not paid 
for any activities related to ANC because she did not take the 
woman for delivery. Similarly, if a pregnant woman returned 
to her natal home in the ASHA’s village, the ASHA was paid 
only partially for linking the woman to institutional delivery. 
In one case, despite the time and effort expended on a pregnant 
woman, the latter used a private health facility at the time of 
delivery, depriving the ASHA of her incentive: “I want some 
facility like fixed salary. Because sometimes in a month, there is 
only one case, and sometimes at the time of delivery people go 
to private hospitals. So I didn’t get any incentive for my work” 
(ASHA #31, Gurdaspur).
Not Inclusive of All Job Aids
Incentives either did not cover or only partially covered tools 
ASHAs needed to effectively do their jobs. Incentives provided 
for specific items, such as purchasing a uniform, were not suf-
ficient, with one ASHA commenting that it was “not enough to 
even buy a dupatta” (stole worn over the shirt or kurta) (ASHA 
#35, Gurdaspur). Payment for transport costs were provided only 
for some activities, such as taking pregnant women to facilities for 
delivery. However, ASHAs were also responsible for facilitating 
ANC, which included accompanying pregnant women and often 
involved traveling long distances. As one ASHA described,
You see I accompany a pregnant woman for 9 months 
and sometimes pay their journey fares also. Our village 
is 5 kms from health facility. There is no bus service. 
I have to take a rickshaw to visit health facility. The 
rickshaw puller takes Rs 20 [US$0.30] for one side and 
Rs 40 [US$0.70] for up and down. I spend on patient’s 
fare along with mine. (ASHA #33, Gurdaspur)
Accredited social health activists also reported using their 
own mobile phones for their work. They used their phones to 
call women to escort them for ANC and contacted them more 
frequently during the time nearing delivery to ascertain the status 
of the pregnant woman and call the ambulance. However, as this 
ASHA reports, their mobile phone charges were not covered, “We 
don’t get money for mobile phone, as we have to call patients and 
ANM frequently” (ASHA #49, Gurdaspur).
incentives as a cause of Friction in Family 
and community
Incentives were also paid inconsistently and, at times, were not 
paid in full, creating tension for some ASHAs with their families 
and communities. ASHAs faced criticism from their husbands, 
some of whom, especially those in Gurdaspur, wanted the ASHAs 
to leave the job. Some ASHAs claimed that they were allowed by 
their husband to continue work because the husbands expected 
the government to provide a regular salary in the near future. One 
husband reported,
Sometimes I feel bad as she does much work but don’t 
get much money. There is no fixed salary for her. Her 
incentives are less, sometimes I feel she should leave this 
job but I don’t ask her to do so because there is hope that 
their job may become regular and they will get fixed 
salary. (Husband #47, Gurdaspur)
The volume of documentation required both for the position 
and to receive incentives drew disapproval from husbands:
When I sometimes do paper work at night, then he 
[husband] says that the work is too much for an ASHA. 
He talks about the work load because now we are given 
very long forms for home visits also. It takes a lot of 
time. (ASHA #17, Mewat)
Neighbors also mocked the ASHAs for working for such low 
pay, as this ASHA described, “Sometimes other persons ask me 
about my salary. They don’t believe me when I say that I don’t get 
salary. Then they tell me why I am doing this work without salary. 
I feel bad about this.” (ASHA #48, Gurdaspur). This was echoed 
by another husband who commented, “They [people in the com-
munity] say that she doesn’t get a salary, she doesn’t get much 
money. Then why she is doing work for such a small amount of 
money?” (Husband #43, Gurdaspur).
Accredited social health activists reported that jealousy among 
community members often caused distrust of their motives, 
especially as payments incentivized particular services, such as 
taking a pregnant woman for institutional delivery and getting 
children immunized. In such cases, families could refuse to heed 
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the advice of the ASHA, as this ASHA reported: “They [women in 
community] say, ‘what is the use of vaccination?’ You want your 
benefit, that is why you are coming to us.” (ASHA #4, Mewat). 
Jealousy of the neighbors affected ASHAs’ work, as one respond-
ent reported, “Some of our neighbors go to houses of pregnant 
women and tell them not to go with me to hospitals…They feel 
jealous of our family. They can’t see progress of our family. So they 
don’t want my work to go well” (ASHA#33, Gurdaspur).
Using incentives to Drive service Delivery
Certain activities may have been prioritized over others due to 
higher incentives. For example, incentives provided for perma-
nent contraception methods were higher than other methods. In 
our study, ASHAs reported increased use of sterilization among 
women in Mewat and men in Gurdaspur. In Gurdaspur, husbands 
of ASHAs motivated other men and accompanied them to the 
facilities to receive vasectomies.
The way ASHAs interpreted messages about incentives may 
also have led them to focus on certain activities. While communi-
cating about incentives, ANMs may have emphasized certain paid 
or higher paid activities to the detriment of others. ASHAs were 
not aware of many incentives other than those for institutional 
deliveries and immunization. The presentation of the incentives 
was misleading for women when deciding to apply for an ASHA 
position. For instance, when asked about whether she was told 
about compensation when she began her position, an ASHA from 
Gurdaspur said:
No. But she [ANM] told me that if baby is delivered 
by c-section [cesarean] then ASHA will get Rs 100 per 
delivery…Madam [ANM] also told me that salary 
would depend upon the delivery cases given to govern-
ment hospitals. (ASHA #36, Gurdaspur)
This perceived prioritization of facility-based cesarean sec-
tions had been felt by the community. ASHAs expressed that the 
community believed that deliveries in institutions were mostly 
done through cesarean sections with little other option: “They 
blame us that doctors assist baby to be delivered by c-section 
intentionally, that they don’t wait for normal delivery” (ASHA 
#35, Gurdaspur).
DiscUssiOn
Our findings revealed two distinct but connected patterns: (1) 
incentives provided a source of independent earning that was a 
cause of enhanced self-worth among ASHAs that motivated them 
to work further and (2) incentives were a cause of dissatisfaction 
and stress due to the nature of their amount, structure, disburse-
ment, and pressure they placed on ASHAs’ relationships with 
family and community. Our findings are similar to other studies 
in which incentives for CHWs are often described as inadequate, 
irregular, delayed, and partly paid (3, 10, 12), affecting their moti-
vation and performance (13, 20, 21). Incentives have been identi-
fied as a major limitation to ASHAs’ role as social change agents, as 
they tended to only engage in remunerated work while doing little 
to introduce social changes (20). In our study, we saw that ASHAs 
may have been pushing those services that were incentivized, 
such as female and male sterilization, which may have involved an 
element of coercion as has been found previously, where incentiv-
izing one form of contraception led to its promotion over others, 
thus curtailing free and informed choice. However, since our study 
included only ASHAs and their family members, we do not have 
the community voice and cannot conclude anything definite.
Payment for CHWs has been a debated topic in the literature (3, 
22–24). While incentives are a source of motivation (3, 25), there 
is little available data, as far as we are aware, on the link between 
financial incentives and sense of empowerment of CHWs in the 
public health literature. We found only one study conducted 
among health program managers that mentions the potential 
of economic empowerment as a source of work effectiveness 
among CHWs (22). Our findings document ASHAs’ expressions 
of empowerment resulting from the financial independence 
afforded by incentives and the individual transformations that 
accompany poor women entering wage employment (26, 27). The 
ASHA program, in this context, is said to be providing a double 
benefit – that of making health care accessible to the community 
as well as providing jobs and remuneration to the female section 
of the community, thus widening the scope for decision-making 
and gender equality among previously disempowered women.
Accredited social health activists in our study reported dissat-
isfaction with part payments and often had no knowledge of how 
much would be paid for what work. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that they wanted to be paid a consolidated amount rather than in 
part payment (28). They also expressed dissatisfaction that the 
incentives paid were not commensurate with the work expected, 
echoing other findings that these did not reflect their abilities or 
level of responsibility (29, 30).
Our study had an added dimension in that we also interviewed 
family members of ASHAs who reported similar dissatisfaction 
with disproportionate incentives and felt that the ASHAs in their 
families worked excessively. ASHAs depended on the goodwill 
of their husbands and families to continue work; disapproval 
might cause them to be less effective in their work. Many ASHAs 
were able to maintain their positions with family support because 
of their spouses’ belief and hope that, in future, ASHAs would 
receive a regular salary. Without movement in this direction, it 
is possible that there will be attrition among ASHAs, particularly 
in a wealthier district such as Gurdaspur. Our findings on com-
munity mistrust of ASHAs’ motives are also in line with other 
studies (3, 7), further warranting support and public recognition 
of ASHAs by health and local government authorities to dispel 
such doubts among community members.
The way ASHAs interpreted messages about incentives is 
a unique finding. We saw that communications about which 
activities would be paid informed the understandings of job 
responsibilities. This is an important area of research as our 
current understanding of communication between health system 
supervisors and CHWs is limited. Women known to the ANM 
or others in the health system structure are selected for the posi-
tion (12, 31). To encourage women to take the role, supervisors 
may provide partial or biased information about paid activities. 
This emphasis could then be interpreted by the ASHA as the best 
activity to be practiced or promoted, such as cesarean sections.
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This study did not explore whether ASHAs targeted those who 
were easier to reach in an effort to obtain incentives with less 
effort. In general, it is found that women with higher household 
income, education, and lower parity utilize maternal and child 
health services more than those who are poor, have low educa-
tion, and higher parity (28, 32–35). It is possible that ASHAs, in 
their hurry to achieve targets for which they are remunerated, 
may not focus on sections of the community that are more dif-
ficult to persuade. This could be an area for further study.
We have to interpret these findings with caution as there are 
limitations in our study. The focus of this study was not solely on 
incentives. The findings presented here are based on the ASHAs’ 
reports on topics tangential to incentives and income, such as 
challenges they experienced in the performance of their duties. 
Interviews may not have explored the topic of incentives as thor-
oughly as if that had been the focus of the study. However, our 
findings do point the way for future research that can contribute to 
more nuanced understandings of incentives in CHW programs.
cOnclUsiOn
Incentives, while contributing to motivation, financial inde-
pendence, and self-confidence among ASHAs, come with many 
caveats around appropriate, acceptable, and timely remuneration 
for activities and the ASHA relationship with her family and 
community, including her supervisors. Future areas of research 
include examining the effect of incentives on whether communi-
ties are receiving unbiased information about health activities, 
whether ASHAs preferentially target higher-income members 
of the community, and how community members feel about 
the information and advice they receive from the ASHA. Given 
the limitations in our study, we tentatively suggest the following 
recommendations: all efforts need to be made to ensure timely 
payments of incentives so that a clear link is established between 
work done and incentive received. Furthermore, efforts should be 
made to “unbundle” incentives associated with different aspects 
of care to ensure that ASHAs are compensated for and perform 
every step in the process. Incentive schemes should also accu-
rately reflect the out-of-pocket costs associated with the position, 
such as transportation and mobile phone costs. There have been 
certain revisions in the incentive structure in both Punjab and 
Haryana since our study. One of this is Closed User Group (CUG) 
connections provided to ASHAs to communicate with fellow 
ASHAs, ANMs, or PHCs free of cost and some credits (INR 50 in 
Punjab, INR 100 in Haryana) for calling outside the CUG (36). 
Similarly, information about incentives should be communicated 
clearly to all those involved in program implementation and most 
importantly, to ASHAs themselves. This information should be 
presented in such a way as to not favor activities with higher 
incentives over other activities. The emphasis should be placed 
on providing quality and appropriate services to all clients. 
Additionally, documentation associated with securing incentives 
should be revised to reduce unnecessary burden on ASHAs, 
including adjusting the documents to be inclusive of all literacy 
levels. Finally, although our findings and recommendations are 
specific to the Indian context, they can be informative to incentiv-
ized programs of CHWs in other low and middle income country 
settings as they face similar issues.
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